In a highly secular Europe, Romania and Poland are exceptional cases provided that they are counted as European. From the time when Eurobarometer surveys included both Poland and Romania, it was clear that there are few countries in Europe that show such robust positive feelings towards the European Union (eu) and such high levels of religious belief. Even after the 2008 crisis, the majority population in both countries displays a positive attitude towards the eu. The World Value Survey shows that the importance of religion has gone up spectacularly immediately after 1990. Church attendance remained constant or had an insignificant decrease in Poland while it increased in Romania.1 Romania is one of the most religious countries in Europe, with 92 % of people saying that they believe in God, followed closely by Poland with a little less than 80%. In addition, Romania had the largest percentage of people who became affiliated with the church soon after communism, a trend that gradually stabilized by 1997 (Voicu 2007). After 2000, in terms of religious participation, 22% of Romanians attend church once a week, up from 15 % a decade earlier. The World Values Survey found church attendance to be around 46 % in Poland down from 49% in the earlier decade. Romania was nevertheless the champion of post-communist religious revitalization with a 15 % increase in participation (Voicu 2007). Given these numbers, it seems fairly easy to read the religious and the European enthusiasm as signs of backwardness where the eu's cohesion funds and God represent some compensators for post-communist economic dismay.
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Some inconsistencies about these numbers remain, however, since high religious belief contrasts with relatively low religious participation as in Romania, or with what nationalism scholar Zdzisław Mach (2000) observed regarding the relaxed sexual mores in Poland. I argue that the difference between belief and professed belief comes from the existence of a civil religion based on tradi-tarta tional religion, and on the particular historical context where both countries traditionally see the Church as a carrier of national identity. In the following pages I will show the historical context in which Churches gained a central role in politics, especially in connection with national identity, and I will show how they nowadays feel threatened by the eu's demands concerning homosexuality. I will analyze a series of works on religious and sexual nationalism related to Poland and Romania to demonstrate that there is a discernable "culture war" happening in these countries whose shape and content depends on two competing visions of identity which I call Euro-Christian civil religion and Euro-secular civil religion. Both countries exited the so-called "Godless Communism" period with a functional religious sector, apparently hardly affected by state policies of secularization. During communist rule both the Polish Roman Catholic Church (prcc) and the Romanian Orthodox Church (roc), have gone through continuous negotiations with the communists and managed to maintain an influential position within society. In Poland, for example, the communists attempted to control and mitigate the prcc through various tactics including a Catholic group (pax) close to the Communists, while on the opposite side, political dissidents (even notorious atheists) also stayed close to the prcc and even attended service, as the prestige of the prcc was highest during the time of open resistance to communists. Similarly, in Romania the communists seized the opportunity from the beginning to influence the roc through controlling the Patriarch (Leustean 2009), through mutual formal and informal support, either by the continuing use of the church for traditional rituals like weddings, burials and baptisms, or through supporting priests' salaries, church building
